Contracts, prices, and no-arbitrage

Consider the following contract

  • Pay price at time
  • Receive at time Note that the cash flow c could be negative!

The no-arbitrage condition bounds the price for this contract

  • Weak No-Arbitrage: for all

  • Strong No-Arbitrage: for all and

    for some

Essentially eliminate the possibility of a free-lunch

The rationale for the weak no-arbitrage condition: Suppose :

  • Since for all , the buyer receives at time , and then does not lose money thereafter. Free lunch!
  • The seller can increase the price as long as , and still have buyers available.
  • Buyers will be willing to pay a higher price in order to compete.

Assumptions underlying no-arbitrage

The rationale for the strong no-arbitrage condition

  • Suppose .
  • Recall that for some for some . Therefore, free lunch as long as .
  • We can only guarantee that but not the precise value! Implicit assumptions underlying the no-arbitrage condition
  • Markets are liquid: a sufficient number of buyers and sellers
  • The price information is available to all buyers and sellers
  • Competition in supply and demand will correct any deviations from no-arbitrage prices

Pricing a simple bond

What is the price of a contract that pays A dollars in 1 year? Suppose one is able to borrow and lend unlimited amounts at an interest rate of per year.

Construct the following portfolio:

  • Buy the contract at price
  • Borrow at interest rate Cash flows associated with this portfolio:
  • Price of portfolio:
  • Cashflow in 1 year: Weak No-arbitrage: implices price , i.e.,

Next, construct the following portfolio:

  • Sell the contract at price
  • Lend at interest rate Cash flows associated with this portfolio:
  • Price of portfolio:
  • Cashflow in 1 year: Weak No-arbitrage: implices price , i.e., Two results together imply . Surprise? The result relied on the ability to borrow and lend at rate r.
  • What if borrowing and lending rates are different?
  • What if borrowing and lending markets are elastic?