Contracts, prices, and no-arbitrage
Consider the following contract
- Pay price at time
- Receive at time Note that the cash flow c could be negative!
The no-arbitrage condition bounds the price for this contract
-
Weak No-Arbitrage: for all
-
Strong No-Arbitrage: for all and
for some
Essentially eliminate the possibility of a free-lunch
The rationale for the weak no-arbitrage condition: Suppose :
- Since for all , the buyer receives at time , and then does not lose money thereafter. Free lunch!
- The seller can increase the price as long as , and still have buyers available.
- Buyers will be willing to pay a higher price in order to compete.
Assumptions underlying no-arbitrage
The rationale for the strong no-arbitrage condition
- Suppose .
- Recall that for some for some . Therefore, free lunch as long as .
- We can only guarantee that but not the precise value! Implicit assumptions underlying the no-arbitrage condition
- Markets are liquid: a sufficient number of buyers and sellers
- The price information is available to all buyers and sellers
- Competition in supply and demand will correct any deviations from no-arbitrage prices
Pricing a simple bond
What is the price of a contract that pays A dollars in 1 year? Suppose one is able to borrow and lend unlimited amounts at an interest rate of per year.
Construct the following portfolio:
- Buy the contract at price
- Borrow at interest rate Cash flows associated with this portfolio:
- Price of portfolio:
- Cashflow in 1 year: Weak No-arbitrage: implices price , i.e.,
Next, construct the following portfolio:
- Sell the contract at price
- Lend at interest rate Cash flows associated with this portfolio:
- Price of portfolio:
- Cashflow in 1 year: Weak No-arbitrage: implices price , i.e., Two results together imply . Surprise? The result relied on the ability to borrow and lend at rate r.
- What if borrowing and lending rates are different?
- What if borrowing and lending markets are elastic?